Strategy Workshops and Strategic Change by MacIntosh, Robert et al.
Strategy Workshops and Strategic Change 
 
Robert MacIntosh, Donald MacLean and David Seidl 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 2008-04 
January 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Munich School of Management 
University of Munich 
 
Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaft 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
 
 
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de 
 
  
2
Strategy Workshops and Strategic Change 
 
Robert MacIntosh 
Department of Management  
University of Glasgow 
Gilbert Scott Building 
Glasgow G12 8QQ 
r.macintosh@lbss.gla.ac.uk 
 
Donald MacLean 
Department of Management 
University of Glasgow 
Gilbert Scott Building 
Glasgow G12 8QQ 
d.maclean@mgt.gla.ac.uk 
 
David Seidl 
University of Munich 
Institute of Strategic Management 
Ludwigstr. 28 
80539 Munich 
seidl@strategic-management.de 
 
Working paper 
 
  
3
Strategy Workshops and Strategic Change 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite the attention that strategic change as a topic of research has received, there 
remain considerable difficulties in conceptualizing the actual sources of strategic 
change. Strategy workshops represent one obvious and explicit research site since 
organizations often use such events as a means of effecting or initiating strategic 
change. This paper examines empirical data from ninety-nine strategy workshops in ten 
separate organizations to address the research question: Do strategy workshops produce 
strategic change? The paper concludes that workshops can produce change but that one-
off workshops are much less effective than a series of workshops. The data presented 
indicates that the elapsed duration of the entire series of workshops, the frequency of 
workshops, the scope and autonomy of the unit concerned, and the seniority of 
participants have an impact on the success or failure of the venture.  
 
KEYWORDS: Co-production of Knowledge; Engaged Scholarship; Strategic Change; 
Strategy as Practice; Strategy Workshops 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the attention that strategic change has received within the strategy research 
community, there remain significant difficulties in conceptualising the actual means 
through which change is achieved. From the research literature, much is known about 
conditions commonly associated with change, e.g. crises (Arthaud-Day et al, 2006) or 
organizational slack (Bourgeois, 1981), yet we know very little about the practice of 
effecting strategic change. Change can be traced back to external inputs such as changes 
in the composition of the top management team (e.g. Clark and Starkey 1988; Grinyer 
and Spender 1979b; Grinyer et.al. 1988; Johnson 1992; Child and Smith 1987; Grinyer 
and McKiernan 1990; Lant et al. 1992) or to the involvement of external consultants 
(e.g. Mezias et al. 2001; Pettigrew 1985), which bring with them new strategic practices 
and cognitive frames to replace the existing ones. Often strategic change is also 
explained as (more or less) a direct consequence of institutional changes in the 
organization’s environment (e.g. Child 1997; Lounsbury 2001). 
 
Difficulties in conceptualising strategic change have given rise to concerns with both 
the subject matter and methodological orientation of strategy research. As regards the 
latter, there has been a growing interest in new modes of knowledge production (Huff, 
2000) or engaged scholarship (Van de Ven and Johnson 2006) which in this paper are 
expressed as a particular combination of mode 2 management research (MacLean et al. 
2002) and multiple case-study methods appropriate to the study of project 
dynamics (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). In terms of subject matter, frustrations 
about the adequacy of strategy theory have driven senior scholars to call for significant 
developments in strategy theorising. Porter appealed for a dynamic theory of strategy, 
more able to address the challenges faced by practitioners (Porter, 1991). Schendel drew 
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attention to the growing, and unhelpful, split between content and process (Schendel, 
1992). In a similar vein, Pettigrew recognised the need for the meaningful integration of 
formulation and implementation (1992). Hamel and Prahalad (1996) urged us to break 
free of limitations of existing mindsets whilst, more recently, Mir and Watson have 
argued for the adoption of a constructivist orientation (Mir and Watson, 2000). 
 
One observable response to such calls, particularly in Europe, has been a shift in the 
focus of attention from macro level studies of firms in their markets towards more 
micro level studies. This is variously described as the study of micro-strategy, 
strategizing (Johnson et al, 2003) or strategy as practice (Hendry, 2000; Whittington, 
2006; Balogun et al., 2007). Taking interest in what managers actually do has a long 
tradition in the strategy process field starting with the seminal studies of Mintzberg 
(1973). Yet, in contrast to earlier research on organizational practices (Dalton, 1959; 
Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982) that emphasized the informal side of managerial work, 
this so-called strategy-as-practice approach – while acknowledging the importance of 
emergence – is calling for a re-appreciation of the role of formal strategic practices 
(Whittington 2003: 118). Researchers have consequently started to look into the 
organizational effects of various formal practices such as formal administrative routines 
(Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2001; Jarzabkowski 2003; 2005) or strategy meetings 
(Jarzabkowski and Seidl 2006). 
 
Recently, attention has begun to centre on the role of strategy workshops in overt 
attempts to effect strategic change. A survey of 1300 UK managers established that 
strategy workshops were a common occurrence in modern organizational life 
(Hodgkinson et al. 2006). The survey indicated that some 90% of such workshops last 
two days or less and that 73% take place away from the organization’s premises. 
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Hendry and Seidl (2003) argued that it is this separation between workshop activity and 
the usual day-to-day activities that enable the participants to step out of their established 
routines and mindsets in order to critically reflect on the organization’s strategic 
orientations. This has fuelled interest in the nature of the workshop experiences for the 
participants (e.g. Schwarz and Balogun, 2007). Adopting a view of such events as 
highly ritualistic (Bourque and Johnson, 2007), arguments have been developed that 
strategy workshops do not always have positive outcomes (Hodgkinson and Wright, 
2002), that they are virtually meaningless (Mintzberg, 1994: 108) and that whilst such 
workshops might represent a “heightened experience” for the participants, “the very 
separation and anti-structure that they foster may hinder the transfer of ideas and plans 
back to the everyday work situation.” (Johnson et al, 2006: 27). Johnson and his 
colleagues use a single vignette to illustrate the point that despite explicit intention to 
follow through the actions agreed at an off-site strategy workshop, little actually 
happened (also argued in Bourque and Johnson, 2007). This is in contrast to a study by 
Schwarz and Balogun (2007) who reported on workshop activities with substantial 
effects on the strategic directions of the organizations involved. This begs the obvious 
question: why do some workshops produce change while others do not? A potential 
explanation is revealed by a closer examination of these two studies. While Johnson and 
his colleagues refer to one-off workshops, the study by Balogun and Schwarz involves 
series of workshops. Yet, a systematic analysis of the differences in outcomes between 
single and multiple workshops is yet to be conducted.  
 
Turning then to the focus of this paper, we address an obvious question: do strategy 
workshops produce strategic change? Unpacking this question immediately throws up 
subsequent questions. First is a definitional problem, what do we mean by a workshop? 
Second, what do we mean by strategic change? Third, what causal implications are 
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called to mind when the verb “produce” is used in this context. Before moving forward, 
short answers to all three questions are required. 
 
In this paper, we take strategy workshops to be explicitly identified events which occur 
outside of the normal schedule of business meetings in the organization. This definition 
is particularly important when considering a series of strategy workshops since it allows 
one to distinguish between a sequence of gatherings where the specific intent relates to 
the strategy workshop from other meetings or gatherings that would occur anyway in 
the normal conduct of the organization’s business. Our second definitional problem 
related to strategic change. The express intention of these workshops is to effect some 
significant and consequential change to the organization’s existing strategy which may 
be observed in terms of such phenomena as the nature of the products or services 
offered, the segments or customers targeted, the mission and scope of the organization, 
the managerial structures and processes used in the organization, etc. A useful short 
hand that we have used elsewhere is to describe this as a shift in the organization’s 
archetype (MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999). Finally, in defining what we mean when we 
ask whether strategy workshops can produce change, we postulate that teams of 
managers (or others for that matter) can instigate a process which is intended to effect 
significant strategic change or reorientation. Elsewhere we have problematized the 
notion of rational managerial action (MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999; MacLean et al 
2002). We are sympathetic to Chia’s observation of the “inherent dynamic complexities 
and intrinsic indeterminacy of organizational transformation processes” (1999: 210). 
Hence, we would acknowledge that the causal mechanisms that produce some 
organizational changes are not easily traced back to specific events. We are also happy 
to acknowledge that, even in circumstances where change is explicit and intended 
outcome of a workshop, any change which subsequently occurs may or may not be 
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precisely (or indeed remotely) what was imagined at the outset of the process. However, 
in this paper the focus of our inquiry is simply whether organizations appear to change 
in any significant way in those circumstances where management teams express the 
publicly stated desire to do so and pursue such desires through activities involving 
single or multiple strategy workshops. 
 
RESEARCH SETTING 
 
The empirical material discussed in this paper was collected as part of a research 
programme conducted with a network of firms operating in the UK. The research draws 
on a study of ninety-nine strategy workshops conducted within a set of ten organizations 
over a five year period. The first and second author of this paper acted both as 
facilitators and action researchers in these workshops and, in each case, these strategy 
workshops dealt with an explicit desire, on the part of at least some of the participants, 
to change the organizations concerned. The organizations participating in the research 
were drawn from a range of small and larger private sector firms and a variety of public 
sector organizations. Some of the larger multi-national organizations were not UK-
based and in these cases our research was conducted with UK-based subsidiaries or 
production facilities. All of the smaller private sector firms and the public sector 
organizations were UK-based. As a backdrop to the strategy workshops conducted 
within the organizations, there was a research network where senior managers from 
each organization would meet bi-monthly to share experiences and discuss findings 
from the research.  
 
The research process was longitudinal since the network ran over a five-year period. 
Over the duration of the study, strategic change processes varied from changes in 
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ownership, to mergers and re-engineering projects. Tables 1 and 2 provides an overview 
of the ten organizations, the workshops conducted and contextual factors which affected 
the change processes. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
For many years, the management research community has debated the relative merits of 
different research designs. Recently, such debates have centered on the processes of 
knowledge production (Starbuck, 2006), in part because descriptions of new forms of 
scientific endeavor have risen to prominence (e.g. Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 
2001). Alongside more traditional-science approaches (labeled mode 1), Gibbons et al., 
point to the emergence of new ways of producing knowledge (labeled mode 2) 
“characterized by a constant flow back and forth between … the theoretical and the 
practical … [where] discovery occurs in contexts where knowledge is developed for, 
and put to use, while results which would have been traditionally characterized as 
applied - fuel further theoretical advances” (1994: 9). A number of scholars have called 
for greater use of mode 2 research in the management field (see Tranfield and Starkey, 
1998; Pettigrew et al, 2001). For a detailed account of mode 2 and its relation to mode 1 
as regards management research methods, the reader is referred to the Special Issue of 
the British Journal of Management (2001 Vol 1(1)) and for our particular expression of 
it in practice to (MacLean et al. 2001; MacLean and MacIntosh, 2002).  
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Given our focus on strategy workshops and their effectiveness, we chose to adopt a 
research design which drew insights from both modes of knowledge production as 
argued by Huff (2000) and by Huff and Huff (2001). In terms of mode 1 research, we 
followed an approach based on the multiple case method used by Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1997), which was in turn a development of Yin’s earlier work (1984). The ten 
organizations considered here were treated independently and a narrative account 
(Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001) was prepared for each describing both organizational change 
experience(s) and the workshop(s) which had been conducted as part of that process. 
This formal research process might be described as “research on” practice and, given 
the lead role played by the academic researchers, is closer to mode 1 than mode 2. 
However, each of these narrative accounts was subsequently shared within the wider 
network of firms participating in the study (subject to the use of confidentiality 
agreements to deal with any commercial or other sensitivities). This meant that the 
study incorporated a high degree of reflexivity (Alvesson, 2003) because researchers 
and managers from other firms could comment upon accounts of change and workshop 
experiences from each of the cases. 
 
As a complement to this mode 1 style of research, we also conducted a more highly-
engaged, mode 2 form of research. We were influenced here by Boje’s observation that 
context is essential for interpreting narratives that occur in organizational settings and 
that without participating in the organization that contextualizes a narrative, meaning is 
difficult if not impossible to grasp (1991). We were sympathetic to Hill et al.’s call for 
increased usage of forms of research where “closeness to, even involvement with, the 
objects of study is required.” (1999: 144) In the ten organizations studied, two of the 
authors also played an active role as contributors by leading the strategy workshops that 
we were also studying. This then, is a form of action research which brings forth a 
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familiar debate about the relative advantages and disadvantages of such a dual role. 
Alongside access and insight, come the potential for bias and non-generalisability. 
 
Action research has a long history in the field of management studies (see Reason and 
Bradbury, 2001). Yet Eden and Huxham, (1996: 78) report that action oriented 
approaches can experience difficulty in finding acceptance on the grounds that they are 
“not science”. Conversely, one might argue that recurring criticisms of the irrelevance 
of management research can be attributed to a reliance on traditional scientific methods 
that are based on objective distance from the research subject. Our “combined” 
approach thus constitutes an attempt at responding to both sets of criticism by aiming 
for the “best of both worlds”.  
 
The data presented in this paper is drawn from ten sets of strategy workshops conducted 
with ten separate organizations over a five year period. These workshops ranged from 
one-off events (with Pharma Co and Electronix A) to a series of workshops running 
over as much as 30 months (with Univ Serv E).  In total, the study examined 99 
workshops.  The duration of the individual workshops ranged from 2 hours to 3 days. In 
those organizations where more than one workshop was held, we introduce the term 
“elapsed duration” to denote the total length of time between the first and the final 
workshops in the series. 
 
In all ten cases we interviewed a minimum of three managers from each organization 
during the research. In most cases we interviewed the whole management team and in 
two cases, the whole organization. Hence in addition to the study of 99 strategy 
workshops, we conducted a total of 63 individual interviews during the study. Our 
direct involvement in both the research and the strategy development processes within 
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these ten organizations also afforded us the opportunity to collect a wide range of other 
primary data as well as secondary data in the form of company documents, reports, 
minutes, field notes, flipchart records produced during the workshops, etc. Just as 
importantly, our engaged from of research gave us and our practitioner co-researchers a 
shared sense of the narrative backdrop which makes interpretation of data meaningful. 
We also attended key management meetings (i.e. regular meetings held as part of the 
on-going operation of the organization). The combined effect of our research activities 
allowed us to develop a level of familiarity with the organizations concerned which 
would not have been possible using other methods.  
 
Given the longitudinal nature of the study, data analysis did not take place in a single 
burst. Rather, the data analysis was an on-going activity led by the academic researchers 
but involving the practitioners in the network at every stage. The process followed was 
consistent with that set out by Eisenhardt (1989) in that the construction of the 
individual narrative accounts initiated the within-case analysis. The focus of this within-
case analysis was to establish the nature of the strategy workshops which had taken 
place. As these narrative accounts became available for circulation amongst network 
members, the cross-case analysis began and engaged all network members. Pairing of 
cases and refinement of insights happened in a temporally distributed fashion, as new 
narratives became available. Each new narrative was dissected and compared to other 
similar and dissimilar cases already in circulation. The focus of the cross-case analysis 
was to establish whether strategic change was occurring or had occurred in each of the 
ten organizations participating in the study. The presence of managers from each of the 
organizations during this process was invaluable since it offered richness, depth, 
genuine reflexivity and new insight during the theory building process. In many ways 
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this was far more helpful than the introduction of other researchers to cross-check and 
validate findings to date.  
 
CRITICAL ASPECTS OF WORKSHOP ACTIVITY 
 
We have examined data from each of the ten organizations where workshops took place. 
Table 3 sets out some further information on the ninety-nine strategy workshops which 
were conducted in terms of which organizations were involved, the elapsed duration of 
those workshops which occurred as part of a series, the frequency of the workshops, the 
scope and autonomy of the unit concerned, the seniority of the workshop participants 
and effectiveness as judged on the basis of self-reported outcomes.  
 
In framing each of the workshops, we asked the host organization to specify what 
“success” would mean at the outset and these statements then provided a comparatively 
clear set of criteria which we subsequently asked the organizations to use in evaluating 
the effectiveness of the strategy workshops. Such criteria ranged from processual 
observations (e.g. more participative decision making in Health Org B) to specific 
performance improvements (e.g. increase productivity by 25% in Baker A), to 
organizational issues (e.g. a change in ownership in Sign Up). Many organizations 
began their change process with more than one stated objective e.g. Health Org B hoped 
to introduce new areas of activity to its portfolio as well as behave in a more 
participative way at senior levels. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
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In reviewing the data we noted four characteristics in relation to these self-reported 
outcomes. First, we considered the elapsed duration, which we defined as the time 
between the start of the first workshop and the end of the series of workshops. Elapsed 
duration ranged from 1.5 days for the single workshop held with Electronix A, to 30 
months in the case of the series of workshops held with Univ Serv E. These elapsed 
durations are grouped as long, medium and short in Table 3. Second, where more than 
one workshop took place, the frequency of the workshops was classified. We describe 
the frequency of workshops as high when the intervals between sessions spanned no 
more than four weeks. Moderate frequency indicates that workshops took place every 5-
10 weeks, whilst low frequency indicates that more than 10 weeks passed between 
workshops. Using these categories of high, moderate and low, the frequency of the 
workshops conducted with each organization are noted in Table 3. Third, the 
organizational scope of the workshops could be considered. Some of the workshops 
were attempting to achieve change in one part of the organization (such as Univ Serv E) 
whilst others related to the whole of the organization and some workshops featured high 
levels of autonomy (e.g. Sign Up) but for others autonomy is described as lower 
because strategic decisions in the workshop setting had to be ratified or negotiated 
elsewhere (as was the case in Gas Works). Finally, we considered the participants in the 
workshop(s). As stated in Table 2, these were typically the directors and senior 
managers of the organizations concerned though some cases featured middle managers 
(e.g. Gas Works). In Table 3 we have distinguished between high and low levels of 
seniority according to whether senior managers were or were not involved in the 
workshops. 
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These descriptive categories of the participants, the organizational scope and autonomy 
of the units concerned, the frequency of the workshops and the elapsed duration of the 
workshops offered an initial set of dimensions on which cases could be compared with 
one another and of correlating workshop characteristics with self-reported outcomes. 
 
Referring back to the criteria set out by the organizations, only three of the ten cases 
produced outcomes which satisfied the prior stated objectives of the workshop(s). In 
terms of successful self-reported outcomes, the shortest elapsed duration to achieve 
strategic change was 12 months (in the case of Health Org B). The frequency of the 
meetings was never below our “moderate” level (Health Org B met every six weeks). 
Furthermore, the scope and autonomy of the organization or unit which the strategy 
workshop(s) focussed upon might be important. In the data, successful outcomes were 
achieved with both whole organizations (such as Baker A) and parts of organizations 
(such as Univ Serv E) but in all our successful cases, the level of autonomy was high. 
Univ Serv E, for example, managed to effect strategic change within a narrower 
organizational scope in that the unit concerned was only one element of a wider 
organizational system and where the wider organization did not participate in the 
change process. However, the workshops held with Univ Serv E featured a divisional 
management team which had high levels of autonomy such that those concerned could 
set their own strategy with reasonable degrees of freedom. There was support and 
enthusiasm for the change process in the wider university but this did not translate into 
active interest or control being exerted over the changes taking place. Perhaps these 
high levels of autonomy were attributable to the fact that the division in question 
offered specialist building and maintenances services that required particular skill sets 
and did not overlap with the rest of the organization in content terms. Likewise, Health 
  
16
Org B was an autonomous unit sitting within a broader network of related but distinct 
organizations in the NHS. 
 
By considering the ten cases, we can begin to build tentative explanations of the success 
or failure (in terms of effecting desired change) of strategy workshops. First, our data 
suggests that a series of workshops is more likely to succeed than a one-off event. 
Echoing the findings of Johnson and his colleagues (2006), one-off workshops did not 
produce strategic change in our data set.  
 
Based on the three cases where the participants reported to have achieved the desired 
change, one could argue that the elapsed duration of workshop activity is related to 
success: each of the three successful workshops ran over at least 12 months. Yet, there 
are other cases in our data which indicate that elapsed duration may be a necessary but 
insufficient condition for success. Eng Consult and Engineer Co ran workshops over 14 
and 24 months respectively but did not achieve desired outcomes. In both cases, early 
successes (the development of new services at Eng Consult and restructuring of the 
business in Engineer Co) did not produce the desired strategic outcomes in the longer 
term. Both organizations which undertook one-off workshops (Electronix A and Pharma 
Co) did not report successful outcomes. 
 
Similarly, the frequency with which workshops occur seems to be significant. None of 
the organizations with a low frequency of meetings achieved successful outcomes. In 
our data, those cases where workshops were held more than 10 weeks apart proved 
problematic. Where low frequency meetings occurred, those involved reported that the 
workshops were individually successful and that the organization “remained committed 
to making the process work” [Director Eng Consult]. Yet, continuity and follow-
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through seemed more difficult in these cases and the self-reported outcomes indicated a 
failure to achieve stated objectives. In an interview about the workshops conducted with 
Engineer Co., one business unit director commented “I like the workshops. But we 
seem to spend most of our time figuring out why we were so excited last time we were 
working on this stuff [the workshop agenda] then a bit more time figuring out why 
things haven’t moved on, then finish off the day fixing a date in the middle distance 
again.” 
 
Combining frequency of meetings and elapsed duration gives an indication of the total 
amount of workshop activity involved (see Table 2). Baker A and Univ Serv E both 
combined high frequency of meetings with a longitudinal programme of workshops. 
However, comparing the cases of Health Org B and Sign Up reveals a more subtle 
dynamic. Both cases involved similar numbers of people (8 and 7 respectively) and the 
delivery pattern produced a similar number of workshops (9 and 7 respectively). Thus 
Health Org B and Sign Up had roughly equivalent numbers of people involved in a 
similar number of workshops for the same total length of time. Sign Up’s failure to 
achieve strategic change might be attributed to the fact that the workshops “came too 
thick and fast” [Sales Manager Sign UP]. Despite the fact that there was real time 
pressure to achieve the change in ownership of the firm because the incumbent owner-
director was keen “to conclude a deal by summer time” [MD Sign Up] and the project 
took place in April. 
 
The seniority of the participants in the process also appeared to have some effect in our 
data. The labels senior manager, director or senior management team can mean different 
things in different industries or in different countries. We have used the language that 
the organizations themselves used in Table 3 to describe those who participated in the 
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strategy workshops. In most cases, participants were described as senior managers or 
directors and this appeared to mean that these were the most senior staff in hierarchical 
terms. However, the board of directors in a private sector firm such as Engineer Co. 
were equivalent to the senior management team of a public sector organization such as 
Univ Serv E where the label “director” was less commonly found. Those who used 
middle managers (i.e. somewhere between first line supervision and the directors or 
senior managers) in the workshops did not achieve successful outcomes, perhaps 
because of an inability to take action between the workshops on the basis of agreements 
struck during the workshops. Our data appeared consistent with that of Hodgkinson et al 
(2006) in that only a minority of the workshops we studied involved middle managers. 
Univ Serv E achieved its objectives whilst involving more junior staff and union 
representatives but these participants were introduced as the workshops progressed and 
were not involved at the outset.  
 
The ten cases described here can be grouped into three sets where self-reported 
outcomes were positive (Baker A, Univ Serv E, Health Org B), transient (Sign Up, 
Engineer Co, Eng Consult, CommuniCo) and negative (Gas Works, Electronix A, 
Pharma Co). We now consider in more detail, examples from each of these groups in 
order to build a richer understanding of the ways in which the descriptive characteristics 
of the workshops (e.g. the nature of the participants, frequency, etc.) played out in terms 
of the contents and consequences of the workshops. 
 
Exploring Successful Workshops 
 
Of the successful cases, i.e. those which produced change in line with original aims, we 
will examine Baker A which was a family-owned business and was facing difficult 
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trading circumstances for the first time in its 80 year history. The owner-directors of the 
business approached us with a remit of effecting a culture change within the 
organization. The initial aspiration of the programme was framed as “creating a learning 
organization … where some of our managers actually begin to manage instead of the 
four of us [the four owner-directors] having to do everything….. and where we begin to 
see some new products and new markets being developed – because it’s pretty clear that 
our traditional markets won’t sustain us” [MD Baker A]. The initial request from Baker 
A was not specifically for a strategy workshop, rather the notion of a workshop 
developed during early diagnostic conversations with the organization. Similarly, the 
notion of a series of workshops was only framed during the first, off-site workshop. In 
fact, the workshops occurred in three distinct phases but each phase was specified as it 
emerged. The first phase of the process centred on a 3-day, off-site workshop with the 
four owner-directors and focused on reviewing the espoused strategy of the firm, the 
motivations and ambitions of its four owner-directors and the ambition to become a 
learning organization. This then framed a series of three workshops in phase two which 
involved the whole management team of the organization, perhaps mimicking what was 
seen to have been a successful workshop format at director level. During this second 
phase, three specific project teams were established to deal with three related but 
distinct tasks: restructuring the firm, achieving productivity improvements and 
developing new products and markets. Also during the second phase, inputs to the 
strategy workshops were provided by other third parties on topics specified by the 
workshop participants (for example, the product development team identified the desire 
to “know more about marketing” so we arranged for a seminar on marketing techniques 
for this team). Thus, the content of the workshops were not prescribed and fixed at the 
outset but rather themes emerged as relevant and expert input was then sourced to meet 
these needs as the workshop series unfolded. 
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In the third phase, the entire management team of Baker A (18 staff) was divided 
amongst the three project teams and each project team was led by one of the owner-
directors. Each project team then held regular workshop sessions which were outside of 
the normal schedule of business meetings. These sessions were minuted and produced 
action points providing an accountability framework which was highly visible. The 
managing director oversaw the progress of all three project teams and monitored 
progress toward the specific targets each had developed. 
 
It is perhaps worth pausing at this stage to consider the significance of this 
accountability framework. Minutes of meetings, including agreed actions, were posted 
on a public notice board in order to keep the whole staff of the company apprised of 
progress within the project. Every workshop started with a review of progress against 
previously agreed actions and discussion of unexpected developments that had occurred 
in the interim. This was then followed by a reflection on what could be learned from 
such events. We played a strong role at the outset in ensuring that this practice was 
adhered to and “championed” by the directors – particularly by ensuring that the 
directors themselves completed actions agreed at the previous workshop and taking 
them to task if this wasn’t the case. Gradually, responsibility for this practice migrated 
to the team members through reference to “ground rules” which they had developed to 
“keep them learning” [quotes from team members at Baker A]. The key point here is 
that the workshops had a specific remit to connect or link with day to day practices in 
the organisation. For example one of the teams held workshops relating to the theme of 
production improvements and the outcomes of these strategy workshops were fed back 
into regular weekly production meetings that occurred within the business. Thus, the 
linkage between the strategy workshops and the on-going conduct of business was 
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effected through actions agreed in one setting being communicated to the other. An 
action-theoretic perspective would point to there being only one organization, but this 
illustrative example offers some indication of the means of translating from what 
Hendry and Seidl call the strategic episode (2003) to the wider organization. 
 
In many ways there should be nothing surprising about the above practices; they may be 
regarded as common sense or sound project management. What might be significant, 
however, is that they draw attention to the fact that the successful workshops were 
embedded in a strategic development project that was managed as a series of linked 
activities combining workshops, normal business and strategic development. This was 
also the case in the other two projects which delivered in accordance with initial intent; 
in both Healthcare Org B and University Serv E, workshops started with a review of 
actions and unexpected changes since the last workshop, with a view to “keeping things 
on track” [Director, Univ Serv E] and learning from experience. This is in stark contrast 
to the somewhat more confusing experience reported above by a Director of Engineer 
Co, where the workshops were held more 6 or 12 months apart and continuity was 
reported as a key blocker by the majority of the workshop participants. In all the three 
cases where the self-reported outcomes were positive, the workshops were a means to 
an end in a high profile transformation project; they were not end in themselves. The 
broader project provided both a context and a mechanism for ensuring that workshops 
were linked. 
 
The workshops themselves had an informal atmosphere and, partly because of the 
longitudinal nature of our engagement, we developed strong ties with both the business 
and the individuals concerned. One of the recurring difficulties was that the MD would 
intervene in operational issues on the shop floor and at one point we convinced him to 
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get his work wear embroidered with the message “I shouldn’t be here” so that 
colleagues could remind him of his commitment to allow his managers to manage. This 
too demonstrates a senior level commitment to enacting in the workplace, practices that 
were agreed in the workshops – i.e. in this case transference or linkage was embodied in 
the MD’s work-wear. 
 
During the workshop series, Baker A posted a financial loss for the first time as a result 
of the BSE crisis in the UK but work on new product development and new markets 
eventually produced a significant rise in turnover (25%), a return to profitability and 
increases in productivity (20%). During the period of the workshops, HR practices 
improved and development plans were introduced for individuals which focused on 
their learning and development needs. These changes in both organization structure and 
training and development processes were taken by those involved as indicative of a 
wider culture change within the organization. 
 
It is also perhaps worth noting that a “crisis” – in this case a financial loss, and thus a 
threat to survival – may have emphasised the importance of the project in which the 
workshops were embedded. This was a project with a great deal at stake. Indeed, in the 
other two successful cases, one organisation (Healthcare Org B) was under threat of 
absorption into another civil service agency (a possible explanation of their desire to 
move away from bureaucratic modes of organising) whilst University Serv E was the 
subject of rumours that it’s entire operation was under consideration as a candidate for 
outsourcing. 
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Exploring Transient Success in Workshops 
 
Of the seven firms in our data set that did not achieve their stated goals over the longer 
term, there were some cases where eventual disappointment was preceded by positive 
signs early in the process. Four firms (Eng Consult, Engineer Co, Sign Up and 
CommuniCo) offered extremely positive reactions to the initial workshops. This points 
to the value of a longitudinal research process because the self-reported diagnosis in the 
early months was that the change process had been successful. As facilitators, such 
positive feedback was welcome but illusory. In Sign Up, the process was deemed to be 
working effectively up until about the mid-point of the project. In Engineer Co and Eng 
Consult, initial changes subsequently produced “a sense that we have reverted to type” 
[Production Director, Engineer Co]. In all four of these cases, the conclusion was 
eventually reached that the organization had not achieved its objectives. In the case of 
CommuniCo, the launch workshop went extremely well, even the particinats themselves 
evaluated the workshop as “absolutely first rate” [Senior Manager, Communico], but at 
the follow up workshop 3 months later it became apparent that the workshop had not 
delivered change back into daily organizational life. Once the participants had left the 
workshop and gone back to their daily routines they had difficulties transferring 
anything from the workshop to the organization. 
 
We will now consider the case of Engineer Co where one explanation of the failure to 
deliver stated objectives could be argued to be the intermittent nature of the workshops 
(the same was also true of Eng Consult). The successful cases used a regular series of 
workshops to deal with a rolling agenda of change related items, whereas in these two 
cases there were 6 or 12 month gaps between workshops. The participants in the 
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workshops did see them as related events with a sense of follow-through but the long 
pauses in the strategic conversation appeared too stultifying. 
 
Engineer Co. was also an established business and had been operating for over a 
hundred years. The firm had transferred ownership to a US-based corporation some 
years earlier and so there was also a corporate strategist from the US headquarters who 
had some influence over the strategy of Engineer Co. This influence had been stronger 
during recent years as performance had been below corporate norms. Like Baker A, the 
stated intention of the workshop(s) had a cultural dimension and a focus on performance 
improvement. The management team expressed a similar desire for “a radical 
transformation project, to break with past ways of thinking about the business and to 
begin to reinvent our future” [MD Engineer Co.]. The MD of Engineer Co. was more 
focused in his request than his counterpart at Baker A and he specifically suggested the 
use of an off-site strategy workshop to kick start the change process within the firm. 
However, unlike Baker A, the frequency of the workshop sessions was low (Table 3) 
and our role as facilitators was channelled through the MD to a greater extent ostensibly 
owing to travel logistics where he would come and see us as opposed to us visiting the 
site. We thus met with the other members of the senior team infrequently. 
 
This project too used a clear accountability framework, but it may have been that the 
infrequency of project team meetings made the project generally lower velocity or 
momentum than was the case in the successful cases. Moreover, whilst it is difficult to 
quantify, the quality of the relationships built between members of the project team and, 
in particular, between ourselves and the practitioners was discernibly different –cordial 
and business-like with Engineer Co but more friendly and personal with the successful 
cases. This perhaps allows both for franker and more probing exchanges in more robust 
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relationships on the one hand, and a greater degree of mutual understanding of each 
others’ concerns on the other.  
 
Also, after the initial round of workshops, the senior management team (the directors 
and heads of the SBUs) handed ownership of the change project to a “change team” 
drawn from the middle management layer of the firm. The intention was “to allow us, 
the senior guys to focus on running the business whilst the change team are freed up to 
change the business” [MD Engineer Co]. In reality, the change team felt somewhat 
more confused about their remit and did not feel that they had the authority to change 
aspects of the organization’s structure, the product range or the markets served. Instead 
of focusing on the originally stated intention of whole-scale transformation, the strategy 
workshops began to focus on operational issues under the strap line “better, faster, 
cheaper.” This served to signal that changes within the firm should produce outcomes 
(e.g. organizational arrangements, production techniques or product designs) which 
were better, faster and cheaper than their predecessors. The resultant reductions in 
operating costs etc. were welcome but seemed to indicate that “[we] had lost the bigger 
picture” [Finance Director, Engineer Co]. 
 
This illustrates a phenomenon which was largely common to the cases in the second 
category of cases – where some change was produced, but not on the scale or scope 
initially envisaged. After the project had been scoped and kicked off, the senior players 
gradually withdrew to varying degrees in Engineer Co., Eng Consult and Sign Up – 
partly under the banner of encouraging others to “own the change by taking charge of 
it” [MD, Engineer Co] and partly because they had “businesses to run” [Director, Eng 
Consult]. 
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One might argue that the real effect of this withdrawal was a weakening of the 
accountability framework, which was in turn exacerbated by lower momentum within 
the project.  Indeed, these two issues may then have operated in a self-reinforcing cycle 
to take the steam out of the efforts to see things through, though one might equally 
argue that cause and effect could be reversed here. 
 
In contrast to Engineer Co and Eng Consult, SignUp’s and CommuniCo’s problem in 
effecting significant changes seemed not to lie in the frequency (high and medium 
respectively) or seniority of participants (both high) but rather in the elapsed duration. 
In both cases the elapsed duration was only three months.  We have already reported 
that participants in the workshops held at SignUp felt that the process unfolded too 
quickly with workshops coming thick and fast.  This offers another inhibiting factor in 
relation to the accountability framework that we have discussed.  When the gap between 
workshops is as little as 1 week, as was often the case in SignUp, participants have little 
opportunity to follow up on actions between workshops due to the pressure of on-going 
business.  A key figure in the SignUp project was the sales director who commented 
that “I’m out of the office most of the time, on the road, drumming up business.  Pretty 
much the only time I spend with the others [his colleagues] is during these workshops 
and I just can’t spare the time in between just now to follow up on action points.” 
 
Exploring Failure in Strategy Workshops 
 
Finally, the third group of cases consisted of those companies in which the workshops 
did not effect any changes at all. This group comprised one company (Gas Works) 
which conducted a series of workshops and two companies (Electronix A and Pharma 
Co) which conducted single workshops. 
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Gas Works shared many common features with workshops held in firms where transient 
change was reported, at least in terms of elapsed duration and frequency.  This case is 
interesting however because it was the only example which featured middle managers 
as the sole participants in the workshops.  Those selected to participate in the workshops 
were given little information on the workshops and were both confused and suspicious 
at the first workshop.  The workshops focused on the organization’s quality systems and 
the commercial impacts that quality procedures had on product development and 
subsequent reliability.  The directors of the firm hoped that by inviting middle managers 
to “help shape a key part of our business, they’ll grow into more commercially astute 
and more proactive people in the business” [Technical Director, Gas Works].  Yet, 
attempts at proactivity stalled each time permission had to be sought from directors who 
were not in attendance during the workshops. 
 
Finally there were the two firms who hoped that a one-off strategy workshop would 
effect strategic change. The participants at the workshops held with Electronix A and 
PharmaCo reported the events as a success at the conclusion of the workshops. 
However, follow up interviews revealed that nothing had changed in the organization 
and that many of the actions and intentions were never followed through.  The 
participants in the workshops held with both Electronix A and PharmaCo were senior 
managers and in both cases, the workshops tackled key strategic issues relating to 
competitiveness and new markets.  Each workshop generated lists of tasks including 
further research on competitors, analysis of competences, etc.  Subsequent interviews 
with those involved in the workshops indicated that none of these action points were 
followed up in any systematic way and that “in any case, there was no forum to report 
them back to” [Marketing Director, Electronix A]. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Having presented the data from our study, we now move on to discuss our findings. 
Given that we have three cases where such (self-reported) observable change did occur 
in line with prior wishes, we now shift our attention to the obvious supplementary 
question: are there any common characteristics in those workshops which do achieve 
change? We have already alluded to the relationship between overall duration and 
frequency of the workshops. In our data, those organizations which stretched the 
process out over 12 months or more but had only intermittent workshop activity fared 
no better than those where the events were one-offs.  A number of participants spoke 
about the momentum of the workshops, in some cases as “the thing that made it work” 
[Service Manager, Health Org B].  We see an analogy with Brown and Eisenhardt’s 
study of high velocity industries (1997) and would describe each of the successful cases 
described here as having high momentum rather than high velocity since those 
workshops with high velocity, such as SignUp, felt overwhelmed by the combined 
pressures of the workshops and on-going organizational activities. 
 
Compressing intensive work into a few months appeared to be an unsuccessful tactic in 
our data set. Why might this be the case? One argument may be that genuine strategic 
change challenges fundamental assumptions about the nature of the organization and is 
therefore problematic. Such processes effectively challenge organization members to 
reconsider the identity of the organization (Beech 2000). This process requires a 
comparatively safe environment and Hendry and Seidl (2003) argue that renegotiation 
of this type occurs within episodes where normal practices are suspended. Hendry and 
Seidl (2003: 183) argued: “The basic function of episodes is simply to make it possible 
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to suspend and replace structures for a certain time period”. Such episodes make it 
possible for the members of an organization to step out of their daily routines in order to 
critically reflect on them (Doz and Prahalad, 1987; Roos and Von Krogh, 1996). In 
most cases the organizations we studied made conscious efforts to suspend day-to-day 
practice during the workshops. This was also described in other studies on strategy 
workshops (Johnson et al., 2006; Schwarz and Balogun, 2007; Bourque and Johnson 
2007). Practices such as holding the workshops off-site and framing interactions during 
the workshops in a very informal manner and on non-hierarchical grounds were 
common. In Engineer Co, the first workshop began with an agreement that “status don’t 
count” [Flip Chart, Engineer Co, Workshop 1]. Yet, whilst Engineer Co’s senior 
management team initiated the strategic change process, part way through they passed 
responsibility on to a group of middle managers who they described as “the change 
team”. The change process eventually lost momentum in part because of perceived “top 
management ambivalence” (Sillince and Mueller, 2007) and some participants in the 
process argued that status did count after all. 
 
In the three successful cases, there was a sense in which the organizations concerned 
needed a period of adjustment before becoming comfortable with the change process. 
Both Baker A and Univ Serv E “edged up to the precipice” [Sales Director, Baker A] on 
several occasions before finally implementing real and lasting changes. Indeed, in Univ 
Serv E, there was explicit discussion of the frustrations that resulted from being “always 
on the cusp of change” [field notes]. Table 4 shows excerpts from the minutes of a 
succession of strategy workshops relating to an agreement to use multi-skilled work 
teams 
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Univ Serv E Workshop Minutes 
June Meeting Reach agreement that our actual objective is to 
transform way we work and our culture 
July Meeting "seeds of REAL progress now at hand" ... in 
reference to discussions about multi-skilled 
working 
August Meeting Agree to identify team members for pilot project 
October Meeting Group in total agreement that we should 
commence [the multi-skill pilot] as soon as 
possible  
November Meeting Agree that supervisor post [for multi-skill pilot 
project] will be adverstised this week. 
 
Table 4: Univ Serv E Pilot Project 
 
Managers at Univ Serv E expressed real frustration that the change project was 
becoming bogged down and that it took 5 months to reach the stage of agreeing to 
advertise the post of team supervisor for the multi-skilled maintenance project. Actual 
work on the pilot project did not begin for several more months. Nevertheless, this 
example also serves to illustrate the role that basic practices such as recording minutes 
and action points played in the three successful sets of strategy workshops. Where 
senior officers of the organization are meeting on a regular basis and there is an 
accountability framework in place, the chances of transferring from the strategic episode 
or workshop back to everyday organizational life increase. 
 
When asked to reflect on the project conducted with Gas Works, managers described 
the workshops as “a space and time for the management team to meet … in a context 
which was not a production meeting, progress meeting, etc” [Middle Manager, Gas 
Works]. Those involved also commented that the workshops “started with a loosely 
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formed agenda and progressively tightened up as it became clear what had to be done.” 
Interestingly, participants also identified two key departures from “the Gas Works way 
of working.” First, the project team checked with the directors less frequently than usual 
and second, the project featured input from everyone as opposed to only those 
responsible for implementation. Given that organizations “find it very difficult to 
generate higher level discourses” (Hendry and Seidl, 2003: 178), these managers appear 
to be arguing that the strategy workshop represented an opportunity for such discourses 
to take place. Since the project at Gas Works did not subsequently produce strategic 
change, one might argue that the opportunity was not sufficiently lengthy and that the 
organization may have experienced switching pressures to revert to its normal mode of 
operating (MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999) particularly with regard to consultation of 
the directors. 
 
Our results might also explain why Johnson et al. (2006) and Bourque and Johnson 
(2007) found that workshops did not lead to any change, while Schwarz and Balogun 
(2007) actually did observe change. Johnson et al. (2006: 27) identified a paradox in the 
effectiveness of workshops: the very same separation of the workshop activity from 
everyday practice that is necessary for new ideas to emerge prevents the transfer of 
ideas and plans back from the workshop to the everyday work situation. In their study 
they referred to one-off workshops. Our observations on the effectiveness of single 
workshops support this view. Yet, what Johnson and his colleagues did not analyse 
were series of workshops. We would argue that the effectiveness paradox is handled by 
conducting series of workshops: such series allow the combination of separation and 
reconnection over the course of several workshops. This again is in line with the study 
of Schwarz and Balogun (2007) who reported on such series. Johnson and his 
colleagues themselves hinted at this when they wrote at the end of their paper: “it may 
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be unrealistic to expect significant outcomes from a one-off event; a series of strategy 
workshops may instead be more effective” (Johnson et al., 2006: 29). Similarly Bourque 
and Johnson (2007) speculate that “the shift from intention to realization may benefit 
from a nested series of strategy workshops” 
 
In the context of a short paper there is also much that is not said, but which could be 
relevant. Some of the organizations faced impending crises, some instigated change 
whilst some were prompted by external or environmental forces. Indeed, the three 
organizations where successful change outcomes were reported did each face some 
sense of crisis. This was real and immediate for Baker A. During one financial quarter, 
early in the project, the BSE crisis wiped almost 40% of the organization’s turnover out 
because sales of meat-based products collapsed amid health scares about the safety of 
beef products. The fact that many of their meat products contained pork or mutton did 
not save Baker A from a significant downturn in revenue. In both Health Org B and 
Univ Serv E, management teams appeared to act pre-emptively to deal with crises 
which were predicted to take effect within the next 12-18 months. In Univ Serv E’s case 
this was the prospect of maintenance work being put “out to tender on the open market, 
such that we’ll need to demonstrate best value” [Director, Univ Serv E]. In Health Org 
B’s case, it was the emergence of a large “competitor” organization which would 
undertake audit work nationally “for all services, except the four areas we cover” [Chief 
Executive, Health Org B]. Electronix A actively fabricated crises to push change 
through or to improve performance standards. “I drop in to the sales team and tell them 
that our biggest customer is walking away. Then I’ll tell the production staff that we 
better be able to double our capacity in 3 months. Neither is strictly true but they have 
the desired effect” [Managing Director, Electronix A]. In our data, the presence of real, 
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anticipated or fictitious crises was not a significant determinant of the success or failure 
of the workshops. 
 
Finally, we must consider our own role(s) as facilitators in this set of workshops. We 
undoubtedly brought particular theories to the workshops. The ten organizations 
concerned knew that we were interested in developing our understanding of complexity 
theory as it applied to social systems. However, in the workshops we also deployed a 
range of fairly standard analytical tools and techniques from the strategy literature, 
similar to those described by Bourque and Johnson (2007). These included SWOT 
analyses, scenarios, PEST, Five Forces, Core Competences, etc. The theories deployed 
by facilitators of strategy workshops are a source of some concern but we would point 
to the fact that the same facilitation process and the same explanatory theories were 
used by the same facilitators in each of the ten cases considered here. This is not to 
suggest a “randomised control test” mentality for the treatment of our data but simply to 
imply that the ten cases are contemporaneous. Perhaps, the success of more longitudinal 
delivery patterns seen in our data is actually a reflection of our style of facilitation, or of 
facilitation that centres to some extent round theories of emergence, or both. In our 
method statement, earlier in the paper, we pointed out that the trade-off between 
detailed and rich personal access to data and generalisability of outcomes is significant. 
There is no evidence in our data to support the contention that one-off strategy 
workshops produce strategic change. However, perhaps a more limited claim would be 
that we have no evidence to suggest that we as facilitators can help to produce strategic 
change through one-off interventions. A more subtle reflection on the data presented 
here would be to question the direction of causality that we appear to imply. The data 
could be interpreted as suggesting that some configurations of frequency, elapsed 
duration and membership produce strategic change. A counter argument would be that 
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the three organizations enjoyed our particular approach to strategy workshops and 
therefore engaged in the process over the longest time.  This could mean that the 
subsequent success or failure of the workshops is a side issue. Whilst this merits 
consideration, we explicitly agreed with each organization that we would not seek to 
prolong the engagement. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we have analysed the extent to which strategy workshops can be used as a 
means of effecting strategic change.  For this purpose we analysed ten case studies of 
companies that organized strategy workshops with the explicit aim of initiating some 
change. Our findings show that strategy workshops can lead to change, but that only 
three out of ten companies reached their stated goals. In our analysis we identified four 
aspects of workshop design that appear to impact upon success or failure: elapsed 
duration, frequency, organizational scope and autonomy, and seniority of participants. 
 
Our paper makes four main contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the 
literature on strategy-as-practice, which takes a particular interest in the role of formal 
practices (Whittington 2003; Jarzabkowski, 2003). As Whittington (2003: 118) argued, 
formal practices deserve our particular attention since not only are they pervasive 
phenomena in organizational life – a large share of organizational activity is concerned 
with formal practices in one way or other – but they also inflict considerable costs on 
the respective organizations. Whilst many researchers have dismissed formal practices 
as “mere rituals” without any wider bearing, strategy-as-practice scholars have drawn 
attention to the significance of rituals as such. They have shown that a “ritualized event 
may be highly significant in and of itself” independently of whether they have any 
  
35
wider effect on the respective organization (Bourque and Johnson, 2007).  In this vein 
some are beginning to analyze strategy workshops as ritualised events (e.g. Johnson et 
al., 2006; Bourque and Johnson, 2007).  In this paper we have gone a step further by 
showing that the formal practices such as workshops are not only significant as rituals 
per se but that they can indeed lead to significant changes in the organization. This is in 
line with other studies on formal practices like administrative practices (Jarzabkowski 
and Wilson, 2001; Jarzabkowski, 2003; 2005) or meeting practices (Jarzabkowski and 
Seidl, 2006) that could also be shown to be highly consequential for the organizational 
development. 
 
Second, the paper contributes to our understanding of strategy workshops as a 
phenomenon. We have pointed to an important distinction between single workshops 
and those that occur as part of a series. In particular since we have studied 99 
workshops conducted over a 5 year period with 10 organizations we have been able to 
comment on the impacts of issues such as the frequency with which workshops are held 
and the level of attention paid to action points, continuity and commitment from senior 
managers.  We have highlighted the mechanisms by which series of meetings overcome 
the difficulties identified by Hendry and Seidl (2003) and Johnson et al (2006) in terms 
of translation from the workshop to the wider organization. We have also demonstrated 
the benefits of mixed method approaches to the study of such phenomena and our 
results therefore allow us to draw tentative conclusions about the circumstances under 
which strategy workshops are likely to succeed or fail. 
 
Third, we have contributed to the wider literature on strategic change by identifying a 
mechanism of endogenous strategic change. Most studies on strategic change trace the 
change back to sources external to the organization, e.g. changes in the composition of 
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the management team (e.g. Lant et al., 1992), input from consultants (e.g. Pettigrew 
1985) or institutional changes in the environment (Lounsbury, 2001). Some authors 
even argue that fundamental change can only come from outside otherwise the 
organization would lose its own basis for action. As Spender and Grinyer (1996: 31) 
write about this line of reasoning: “The source [of change] cannot be… the organization 
itself. It must come from some other level because, as it enters this period of critical 
change, the organization loses its identity and its ability to make sense of the world.” In 
contrast to this, our study showed strategy workshops to be an organizational source of 
strategic change. With their strategy workshops organizations create a kind of “liminal 
space” (Czarniwaska and Mazza, 2003; Bourque and Johnson, 2007; Sturdy et al., 
2006) with its own structures and practices from which the members of the organization 
can reflect the organization as if from outside. Strategy workshops constitute a separate 
social context within the organization from which the organizational members can 
question the organization’s identity and instigate change without dissolving the 
workshop itself as their basis for reflection and action (cf. Seidl, 2005). In this sense 
strategy workshops provide separate frames of reference to which the members of the 
organization can routinely turn back during the course of the change process in order to 
discuss and make sense of their problems with the change process (cf. Weick 1995). 
While the organization itself is changing the strategy workshops themselves can provide 
a stable ground from which to reflect and decide on action. 
 
Our fourth contribution relates to the methodological approach adopted in this study and 
connects to recent debates on new modes of knowledge production (Huff, 2000).  Our 
research project provides an empirical example of what Van de Ven describes as 
“engaged scholarship” (2007).  In particular, the role of the practitioners in both framing 
and conducting the research process represents something of a break with the 
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conventional division of labour applied in much of the social sciences. Starbuck 
recently pointed to the folly of building hypotheses and theory around “random noise” 
(2006: 15) but in our approach, practitioners were central to the research process. Their 
participation in a network forum where research findings from one firm were presented 
then contrasted with findings from other firms within the network suggests a much more 
active form of participation in the research process. A number of the practitioners from 
the research network have co-published with us on both theoretical and methodological 
issues and indeed at some points practitioners participated in the research process 
underway in other firms in the network.  Many scholars have raised calls to adopt new 
and more engaged ways of bridging the relevance gap but forms of co-production such 
as the one described here represent an attempt to enact these calls.  
 
Finally, for practitioners the paper has important implications. First of all, it has shown 
that single strategy workshops are very unlikely to be successful if one’s purpose is to 
effect organizational change. Workshops designed as series are more likely to be 
effective since this allows participants to combine distance and connection with the 
organization. Second, in the design of the series it seems important to attend to the 
overall duration of the workshops, the frequency of the workshops, the organizational 
scope and autonomy, and the seniority of participants. While all of this does not 
guarantee any success, our study at least implies that it will raise the chances for 
workshops to have the intended impact.  For those considering the use of strategy 
workshops or for those attempting to design and facilitate them, these may form useful 
inputs to the decision process. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Organization Case Overview 
 
Contextual Factors 
Baker A A family owned firm, Baker A had operated successfully for the majority of its 80 year history. However, recent trends in the 
market had led to a decline in sales as customers began to shop at large supermarkets (which Baker A did not supply) 
instead of small local shops (which were Baker A’s primary distribution channel). The organization recorded a substantial 
financial loss for the first time and this instigated a change programme to reduce costs, introduce new products and 
penetrate new markets. This change process occurred over an 18 month period. 
 
The gradual changes in consumer behavior were accentuated by the BSE 
crisis in the UK. This had the effect of decimating demand for meat-based 
products which, at the time, represented 40% of turnover. 
Univ Serv E A large, non-academic unit in the administration of an older UK university, this service felt the need to transform its working 
practices as its services might be under consideration for open tendering in the near future. Responsible for the 
maintenance of the university’s estate, the organisation employed several hundred staff ranging from cleaners to architects 
and chartered surveyors. The process extended over 30 months. 
 
Potential outsourcing of services as part of a value-for-money drive in the 
public sector in general and in the University’s senior management team 
in particular. 
HealthOrg B Provided a form of quality assurance service to the rest of the National Health Service in Scotland. A small core team of 
staff was augmented by a much larger group of reviewers and a specific range of health services were audited on a rolling 
basis when one member of the core staff and a team of reviewers would visit a particular site for a one week period. Health 
Org B felt the need to transform the way it operated in light of the changes in its operating environment. This process 
extended over 12 months. 
 
A number of triggers included changes in the political system (as a new 
Scottish parliament was established) and the fact that a new health 
inspectorate was set up covering a far broader range of health services. 
Sign Up A small independent manufacturer based in the UK and selling signage exclusively to the local market. The owner and 
founder of the business was approaching retirement and wanted to hand the business over to his employees. Recent 
attempts to professionalise the sales force had proved somewhat difficult and the firm recognised the need to tackle 
potential markets beyond their immediate geographic territory. The process lasted 3 months. 
 
An impending change of ownership prompted by the decision of the 
owner and managing director to retire. 
Gas Works An SME which manufactured testing equipment for the gas industry wanted to expand its current activities, growing in both 
size and scope. The incumbent management team felt that the business was being stifled by a relatively dormant layer of 
middle managers. The intention of the programme was to adopt for proactive and participative approaches to the 
management of the firm, thereby increasing its capacity to tackle new products, technologies and markets. The workshops 
ran over a 3 month period. 
 
Dissatisfaction with a relatively stagnant market position, despite the 
absence of real commercial or financial pressures to change. 
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Engineer Co A UK based subsidiary of a US engineering firm, Engineer Co manufactured complex products for the energy industry. 
Originally an independent company founded in the 19th Century, Engineer Co was now under increasing pressure from its 
US parent to improve performance in financial terms or run the risk of disposal and possible closure. A new MD was 
appointed and he instigated a change programme aimed at restructuring the business and restoring profitability, which ran 
over a period of 24 months. 
 
Trading difficulties had been exacerbated by exchange rates which 
effected the firm’s competitiveness in export markets. The key trigger was 
however, the appointment of a new MD. 
Eng Consult A small, independent group of highly qualified structural engineers who offered consultancy services to major clients in the 
construction of big infrastructure like briges, dams, etc. The firm had been the subject of a management buy-out when the 
founder reached retirement age. Now, a few years into the new ownership of the firm, the management team felt a strong 
desire to develop new markets as well as change the culture of the business. The process lasted 14 months. 
 
A recognition that the head-office (in London) was not financially viable 
unless it attracted major new business or reduced costs, or both. At the 
time of the study, losses in the London office were being off-set by profits 
from overseas activities. 
CommuniCo This study took place within the UK division of a global IT services organization which employed over 100000 staff world-
wide and had an annual turnover of $15billion. Several years of rapid expansion had come to an end, and as the business 
stabilised there was increasing pressure to reduce costs in order to maintain the kind of margins that shareholders had 
come to expect. The change process studied related to the development new ways of delivering a key service contract. 
The new contract was to be arranged on a rolling basis, valid for 3 years but revisited every year. Two workshops took 
place over a 3 month period. 
 
The driver for this change process was a corporate plan to improve 
productivity and profitability. This was generated by “head-office” and was 
being operationalised by the various divisions.  
Electronix A Electonix A supply a variety of components for use in a range of electronic devices. This US based organization was 
establishing a manufacturing plant to service the European mobile phone industry. The change process being studied here 
was the establishment of a new manufacturing facility. A single workshop was held lasting 1.5 days. 
 
Whilst the initial trigger for change was external (i.e. the decision by the 
parent company to establish a new site), on-going changes once the plant 
was opened were driven internally. 
Pharma Co A sales organization which sold and distributed pharmaceutical products to the health sector in the UK. The head of the 
sales operation wanted to see a far more dynamic approach to market development. The intention was to transform the 
culture of the organization. A single workshop was held lasting 2 days. 
 
Relatively poor performance in comparison to key competitors who were 
now actively targeting markets and customers of Pharma Co. 
 
Background Data on Each Organization  
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TABLE 2 
 
Organization Whole / Part of 
Organization ? 
Strategy Workshops 
 
Location(s) No. of 
Workshops 
Typical Duration of 
Workshops 
Elapsed 
Duration 
Participants 
Baker A Whole Monthly then becoming 
fortnightly workshops 
Off-site launch then 
on-site  
34 Ranged from 3 days 
(for off-site) to 2 hours 
(for on-site) 
18 months Owner-directors plus 
management team 
Univ Serv E Part Monthly Wworkshops Off-site 32 Typically 3 hours 30 months Senior management team plus 
union representative(s) from 
month 5 
HealthOrg B Whole Six-weekly workshops  Off-site launch 
followed by alternating 
pattern of on then off-
site 
9 2 days at first workshop 
then half-days 
12 months Senior management team 
Sign Up Whole Weekly then fortnightly 
workshops 
Off-site launch then 
on-site  
7 1 day at first workshop, 
then 2 hours 
3 months Owner-director plus all 
organization staff (total of 9) 
Gas Works Part Weekly then fortnightly 
workshops 
Off-site launch then 
on-site  
6 1 day at first workshop, 
then 2 hours 
3 months Middle managers 
Engineer Co Whole Annual 2-day workshops 
plus intermittent shorter 
workshops 
Two off-site 
workshops, on-site 
follow-up workshops 
4 2.5 days (off-site) 
1 day (on site) 
24 months Directors plus change team 
(made up of middle managers) 
from month 12 
Eng Consult Whole 3 day workshop plus two 
shorter workshops 
Off-site launch then 
on-site 
3 3 days (off-site) 
half-day (on-site) 
14 months Owners / directors 
CommuniCo Part Initial workshop with 
follow-up workshop 
Off-site launch then 
on-site follow-up 
2 2 days (off-site) 
3 hours (on-site) 
3 months Senior management team 
Electronix A Whole Single workshop Off-site 1 1.5 days 1.5 days Directors and senior managers 
Pharma Co Part Single workshop Off-site 1 2 days 2 days Senior management team 
 
Overview of Data Set 
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TABLE 3 
 
Group Organization Elapsed 
duration 
Workshop 
Frequency  
Scope and Autonomy 
of Unit Concerned 
Seniority of 
participants 
Self-Reported Outcome 
1 Baker A Long High Whole organization and 
high levels autonomy 
High Strategic change achieved 
1 Univ Serv E Long High Part of organization but 
high levels of autonomy  
High Strategic change achieved 
1 Health Org B Long Moderate Whole organization with 
only minor restrictions to 
levels of autonomy 
High Strategic change achieved 
2 Sign Up Medium High Whole organization and 
high levels of autonomy 
High Some initial change but failure to 
achieve stated aims 
2 Engineer Co Long Low Whole organization but 
moderate autonomy 
Only initially high Significant early success but eventually 
reverted to former archetype 
2 Eng Consult Long Low Whole organization and 
high levels of autonomy 
High Some initial change but failure to 
achieve stated aims 
2 CommuniCo Medium Moderate Part of organization but 
high levels of autonomy 
High Some initial change but failure to 
achieve stated aims 
3 Gas Works Medium High Part of organization and 
low levels of autonomy 
Low Failed to achieve stated aims 
3 Electronix A Short Single 
workshop 
Whole organization and 
high levels of autonomy 
High Failed to achieve stated aims 
3 Pharma Co Short Single 
workshop 
Part of organization and 
moderate levels of 
autonomy 
High Failed to achieve stated aims 
 
Self-Reported Outcomes 
